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The 1976 Copyright Revision Act
and Authors' Rights: A Negative Overview
ARTHUR STANLEY KATZ*
"The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
... the exclusive Right to their respective Witings.
U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 8
"The beginning of wisdom is: Get wisdom;
But with all thy getting, get understanding."
PROVERBS, IV, 7
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1790 the first copyright law of the United States was
enacted by the First Congress and signed into law by President
George Washington on May 31, 1790.1 In 1976 the second Session
of the 94th Congress enacted the "Copyrights Act, An Act for
the general revision of the Copyright Law, Title 17 of the United
© Copyright 1977 Arthur Stanley Katz
* J.D. New York University School of Law (1950). Member New York Bar
(1950), California Bar (1952). Adjunct Professor of Law Pepperdine University
School of Law; In private practice; Member, Los Angeles Copyright Society.
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1. 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
States Code, and for other purposes."2 This act was signed into
law on October 19, 1976 by President Gerald Ford. The 1976
Copyrights Act [hereinafter "the Act"]3 was the fourth general
revision of the copyright laws of the United States.4 Title 17,
which the Act amended in its entirety, is basically the Copyright
Act of 1909, as amended.5 The Act generally takes effect on
January 1, 1978.1 It was over two decades in the making'-and it
shows it.
The Act bears the fingerprints, footprints and scuff marks of
rival pressure groups, each anxious to shape the law in its own
image and likeness. 8 Amendatory language overlays amenda-
2. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. Before passage the Bill was called S.22.
Effective Date of the Act: Section 102 of Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598,
provides that: This Act becomes effective on January 1, 1978, except as other-
wise expressly provided by this Act, including provisions of the first section of
this Act. The provisions of sections 118, 304 (b), and chapter 8 of title 17, as
amended by the first section of this Act, take effect upon enactment of this Act
[Oct. 19, 1976].
Lost and Expired Copyrights: Recording Rights: Section 103 of Pub.L. No.
94-553, 90 Stat. 2599, provides that:
This Act does not provide copyright protection for any work that goes
into the public domain before January 1, 1978. The exclusive rights, as
provided by section 106 of title 17 as amended by the first section of this
Act, to reproduce a work in phonorecords and to distribute
phonorecords of the work, do not extend to any nondramatic musical
work copyrighted before July 1, 1909.
Authorization of Appropriations: Section 114 of Pub.L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2602, provides that: "There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such funds
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act."
Separability of Provisions: Section 115 of Pub.L. No 94-553, 90 Stat. 2602,
provides that: "If any provision of title 17, as amended by the first section of this
Act, is declared unconstitutional, the validity of the remainder of this title is not
affected."
3. Sec. 101 of Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 amended Title 17 of the
United States Code in its entirety. The 1976 General Revision of Copyright Law
is codified in Title 17, §§ 101 through 810. Sections of the Act, as referred to in
this article, refer to these sections of Title 17.
4. H.R. (Judiciary Committee) No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 47,
Congressional Record Vol. 122 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; see
also, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, No. 13 at 6090 (Nov. 29, 1976); Copyright
Office Circular la, at 3-4 (October 1976).
5. 35 Stat.1075. The 1909 Act was codified into positive law as 17 U.S.C. § 1
et seq. by section 1 of the Act of July 30, 1974, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. In 1955, with funds provided by the Congress, the Copyright Office
undertook a research program as the groundwork for the present copyright
revision. Following its publication of 35 monographs on the various aspects of
copyright revision and the issuance in 1961 of the Copyright Office's Report of
the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the United States
Copyright Law, the first revision legislation was introduced in the 88th Con-
gress on July 20, 1964. Its designation in the House of Representatives was H.R.
11947, and in the Senate, S. 3008. For the subsequent history of the various
revision bill versions, see HOUSE REPORT at 47-50.
8. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE COPYRIGHT REVISION BILL issued by THE Au-
THORS LEAGUE OF AMERICA, INC. (Oct. 8, 1976). In his preface to said report, John
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tory language. The singleness of purpose and the clarity of text
so essential for the construction and interpretation of stat-
utes' 0 -and absolutely vital in the exegesis of ground breaking
legislation1 ' lie buried under layers of verbiage. 2
The Act is one huge legal tell. 3 Archaeologists may well fare
better than jurists and lawyers in unearthing its hidden mean-
ings, especially as they pertain to authors. In short, it is the
contention of this writer that somewhere twixt cup and lip,
somewhere between promise and performance, the Congress
has short changed the authors of copyrightable works in its
desire to accommodate the users of such works "for the public
good.' 14
Hersey, the famous author, and President of the Authors League declared in
part: For two decades The Authors League has been working on this
prime instrument and safeguard of our livelihood, [i.e., the Act] and
virtually every provision in it that concerns authors bears the stamp of
our influence. The new law is not perfect; it has seen fighting and its
body shows some scars. But on the whole-thanks in many instances to
our hard work in the face of immensely powerful lobbies of interests
inimical to our own-it is a good Bill. A search of the twenty year
record of the Copyright Revision Bill will show Irwin Karp's finger-
prints all over it .... [Mr. Karp is the distinguished legal counsel for
The Authors League.].
The writer of this article, for the reasons noted therein, is not as sanguine as Mr.
Hersey, concerning the merits of the new law as it affects authors' rights.
See also, the dissenting views of the Hon. Joshua Eilberg, of the House
Judiciary Committee as contained in HousE REPORT at 365-368.
9. One need but read the various committee and conference reports ac-
companying each of the bills which culminated in the Act to note this phenome-
non of drafting. Specific examples are cited in the body of this article.
10. See, e.g., Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 178, 10 L.ed.408 (1840) and McCul-
lough v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898). With specific applica-
tion to copyright statutes, see American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S.
284 (1907).
11. See, e.g., Re Kang-gi-shun-ca (Re Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883). With
specific application to copyright statutes, see, De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570 (1955) and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
12. See, e.g., § 101, §§ 106-118, § 203 and § 304 of the Act.
13. A "tell" is the name (from the Babylonian tillu "ruinheap") given to the
cone like mounds, with flat tops and sloping sides, found in the Middle East and
containing the ruins of successive occupation of new settlers, "each marked by
its own stratum, like the layers of a cake." See, W.F. ALBRIGHT, THE ARCHAEOLO-
GY OF PALESTINE at 16-18 (1961)
14. The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, re-
flects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
1976 Copyright Revision Act[VOL. 3:171, 1977]
This article does not pretend to analyze all portions of the Act.
Such an all encompassing analysis is best written by a treatise
writer. Accordingly, this article is primarily concerned with
examining the differing treatment afforded the subject of DU-
RATION OF COPYRIGHT under the present Copyright Law,
17 USC §1 et seq., and under the 1976 Copyrights Act for the
purpose of determining the impact of such differences on the
rights of "authors", as that term is used in its broadest generic
sense to encompass the maker, creator or originator of that
broad gamut of tangibly expressed intellectual productions
other than inventions, trademarks, trade names, service marks,
trade secrets, and ornamental designs of useful articles (some-
times called "industrial designs").15
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the United States and
the primary object in conferring the monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie
in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of au-
thors.' Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127, 13 USPQ 243, 244
(1975). See Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Raymond,
6 Pet. 218, 241-243. When technological change has rendered its literal
terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this
basic purpose. [Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 391 U.S. 390 at
395-396 n.7 (1968)].
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 154-155 (1975).
15. The Act does not define the term "author." However, section 102 (a) of
the Act sets forth seven (7) categories of "works of authorship" in which
copyright protection subsists under the Act.:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
HousE REPORT, note 3, supra, at 53, emphasized that the seven categories
listed are "illustrative and not limitative", that is, ". . .the list sets out the gener-
al area of copyrightable subject matter, but with sufficient flexibility to free the
courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of the scope of particular caegories
[sic]."
Section 102(b) of the Act defines the nature of copyright and declares:
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
The HOUSE REPORT, note 3, supra, at 57 illustrates the scope of § 102(b) by
discussing the copyrightability of computer programs:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer pro-
grams should extend protection to the methodology or processese
adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the 'writing' expres-
sing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make
clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyright-
able element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or
methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the
copyright law.
Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright
protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the con-
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Duration of Copyright is covered by five (5) sections in chap-
ter 3 of the Act, namely sections 301 through 305.16 However, the
format of the general revision of Title 17 is such that chapter 3
cannot be intelligently examined in vacuo. Accordingly, refer-
ence will be made to numerous sections in other chapters, par-
ticularly to sections in chapters 1 and 2.
Chapter 3 contains five sections: Section 301 does away with
"common law copyright", and establishes a federal statutory
copyright for all copyrightable works from their creation and,
with certain exceptions, preempts the States from regulating
rights in the nature of copyright in works coming within the
scope of the Act. Section 302, with certain exceptions, estab-
lishes the term of copyright for the life of the author, plus 50
years after his death for works created on or after January 1,
1978. Section 303 covers copyrightable works now protected in
perpetuity under commonlaw principles. This section grants
statutory protection for the term set in section 302 with the
possibility of a greater term if the work is published on or
before December 31, 2002. Section 304 concerns subsisting
copyrights. Works in their present first term and works in their
present renewal term would be extended to expire 75 years after
first publication or registration. In addition, the author (or if
deceased, certain members of his family) is able to recapture his
copyrights by terminating the transfer or licensing of his renew-
al rights. This right of recapture can only be exercised during
text of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic
dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.
Section 103 treats of "compilations and derivative works" as subject matter of
copyright. Protection is the same as accorded such works under 17 U.S.C. § 7 of
the present Copyright Act. See section 103 in Appendix.
In short, the Act, in section 101, emphasizes that copyright protects only the
expression of the idea, and not the idea itself. See also, A.S. KATZ, Copyright
Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings and Designs, 19 LAW & CONTEM.
PROB. 224, 239-241 (1954). Section 101 also uses the term "works of authorship" to
cover those tangibly expressed copyrightable products of the mind which fall
under the broad rubric "applied art." The writer uses the term "author" in this
article to refer to all who create copyrightable works of applied art, as well as to
all who create concretely expressed non-copyrightable works such as slogans,
titles and television program ideas. For the distinction between works of applied
art subject to protection under the Act, and industrial designs not subject to
copyright protection, see HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT No. 94-1733, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 82 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT]; see also U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, No. 13, 6253 (Nov. 19, 1976).
16. The subject sections are reproduced in the Appendix to this article.
the last 19 years of the extended copyright, and then only within
a specific period. Under section 305 all copyright terms run to
the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise
expire.
Section 301 is examined in Part II of this article, NATURE
OF THE RIGHTS GRANTED, 7 and sections 302 through 305
are examined in Part III, DURATION OF THE RIGHTS
GRANTED.18
Section 301 is designed to give the Federal Government
preemption over the regulation of rights equivalent to
copyright. This principle is epitomized in the House Report19 as
follows:
Section 301, one of the bedrock provisions of the bill, would ac-
complish a fundamental and significant change in the present law.
Instead of the dual system of 'common law copyright' for unpublished
works and statutory copyright for published works, which has been in
effect in the United States since the first copyright statute in 1790, the
bill adopts a single system of Federal statutory copyright from crea-
tion. Under Section 301 a work would obtain statutory protection as
soon as it is 'created' or, as that term is defined in Section 101, when it
is 'fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time.' Common law
copyright projection for works coming within the scope of the stat-
ute would be abrogated, and the concept of publication would lose its
all-embracing importance as a dividing line between common law
and statutory protection and between both of these forms of legal
protection and the public domain.
By substituting a single Federal system for the present anach-
ronistic, uncertain, impractical, and highly complicated dual system,
the bill would greatly improve the operation of the copyright law and
would be much more effective in carrying out the basic constitutional
aims of uniformity and the promotion of writing and scholarship.
(emphasis supplied)
The same House Report declares that the Register of
Copyrights regards the "life-plus-50 term [to be] ... the founda-
tion of the entire bill. '20
These are salutory purposes: to bring order out of chaos and
fair economic benefits to the author and his family. However,
the Act fails to fulfill these purposes. Indeed, it may well be less
beneficial to authors than the present Copyright Act. Poor
draftsmanship is a prime reason.21 Strong special interests pres-
sures is another.22 The intervention of government into licens-
17. See, p. 177 infra.
18. See, p. 192 infra.
19. HousE REPORT note 4 supra at 129.
20. Id. at 133.
21. See note 12 supra.
22. The pressures by community antenna television systems (CATV) for
special treatment is a key example, see, § 111 of the Act.
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ing and royalty setting arrangements is a third.23
Too much of the Act's critical language is opaque, obtuse,
convoluted and unclear. And too many of the author's "exclu-
sive" rights have been eroded by undue exceptions, suspect
emendations and abject abdications of legislative responsibil-
ity.2 4 As a consequence, the Act is peculiarly pregnant with pos-
sibilities for persistent pettifogging, perpetuation of error, and
incitement of limitless litigation. The proud glowing promise of
more protection for products of the mind, and more prosperity
for their creators, has paled into a pallid pile of potash. In short,
the Act will create havoc in the halls of academe, consternation
in the seats of commerce and crises in the courts.
An analysis of some pertinent provisions will bear this thesis
out.
II. NATURE OF THE RIGHTS GRANTED
It is neither the intent, nor the function of this article to dwell
at length on sections of the Act other than those in chapter 3.
However, the interdependence of the various sections of the Act
is so pronounced that a lawyerlike analysis of chapter 3 is im-
possible without some reference to, and brief comment upon,
sections in other chapters of the Act.
Of prime importance is section 101 "Definitions". 25 This sec-
tion defines numerous terms and concepts, however, it fails to
define the terms "Author", "Writings" of an author, or to pro-
vide the meaning of the term "original." This is passing strange
in light of the fact that the Congress' constitutional right to
enact legislation to protect "Authors" is restricted to protecting
their "respective, i.e., 'original', Writings." That the definition of
these vital terms can be done succinctly is evidenced by the ease
with which it was done in one paragraph by the United States
Supreme Court in Goldstein v..California.26
23. See, e.g., § 115, 116, 118 and 99 801-810 of the Act.
24. A glaring example is § 113 which plays games with the rights enjoyed by
architects and engineers, among others, who create works in a two dimensional
plan form from which three dimensional structures are constructed. For further
discussion, see pp. 181-83 infra.
25. See Appendix for full text of section 101.
26. 412 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1973)
By Art I, § 8, cl 8, of the Constitution, the States granted to Congress
the power to protect the 'Writings' of 'Authors'. These terms have not
Section 101 states that:
A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the
first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion
of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as
of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different
versions, each version constitutes a separate work.
One notes four interesting factors: (1) without "fixation" there
is no "creation"; (2) the "original" of a work is also its copy (this
is consistent with the common law meaning of the term, i.e., the
"copy-right" being the author's right to control the reproduc-
tion of the copy, or text of his work);27 (3) the term
"phonorecord", a term new to copyright law is introduced; and
(4) a work of episodic or monumental portions, such as a
serialized novel, or a symphonic work, can have a number of
measurable "creation" dates. This can cause confusion as to the
duration of a particular copyright, since, under section 302(a)
of the Act 28 "[c]opyright in a work. . . subsists from its creation
The definitions of "fixation" of a "copy" demonstrate that a
work expressed in words, signs or symbols cannot be deemed
"created" unless it is preserved in some tangible form called the
"copy." By the same rationale, a work expressed in sounds or
images, or both, cannot be deemed "created" unless it too is
preserved in some tangible form. These tangible forms, insofar
as they concern "images", are called "Audiovisual Works", and
as they concern sounds, they are described in the Act as
"phonorecords" (an awkward term) or as "sound recordings."
Inasmuch as there can be no creation without fixation, it
follows that the performance of a work consisting of sounds, im-
ages, or both-which has never been fixed in some tangible
form or medium-does not render such work eligible for
copyright under the Act, since the work has not yet been
"created." The same result obtains where the performance of
such work is transmitted "live", for example, by television, and
no videotaping or filming and recording is simultaneously being
been construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach
necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles. While
an 'author' may be viewed as an individual who writes an original
composition, the term, in its constitutional sense, has been construed to
mean an 'originator,' 'he to whom anything owes its origin.' Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). Similarly,
although the word 'writings' might be limited to script or printed mate-
rial, it may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of the
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor. Ibid.; Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). Thus, recordings of artistic performances
may be within the reach of Clause 8.
27. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2396-97, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 251 (K.B. 1769).
28. See Appendix for complete text.
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made of such transmitted performance.29
Under the foregoing definitions, a live extemporaneous lec-
ture, a live non-taped and scriptless television interview with a
public figure, a live, non-filmed performance of a stageplay or
teleplay, and a live, unrecorded symphonic concert (and other
analogous non-fixed works) are incapable of protection under
Federal Copyright until "fixed". 30 However, the preemption by
the federal government in section 301(a) of the Act 31 of all juris-
diction over
. ..all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium
of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after
[January 1, 1978] and whether published or unpublished
explicitly permits a state court to grant relief under common law
principles, or under its statutes, to those "works of authorship
not fixed in any tangible medium of expression". 32
The drafters of the Act do not always fare as well in making
their thoughts clear as they did in treating of the protection
accorded non-fixed works of authorship. Thus the Act is replete
with vagaries and inconsistencies. Two examples (among many)
are particularly illustrative. One example concerns subsection
(b) of section 102, as interrelated to section 301. 33 The second
concerns subsection (b) of section 113,34 as interrelated to the
definition of a "derivative work"35 in section 101, clause (2) of
section 106,36 and to section 301.
It is the cornerstone upon which the edifice of copyright law
has been built that copyright does not protect the ideas used in a
work.37 Copyright protection embraces solely the arrangement
of the words (or symbols),38 or the expression of the ideas. 39
29. See section 101 in the Appendix for the definitions of "fixed" and
"created".
30. See section 102 in the Appendix.
31. For the full text of section 301, see Appendix.
32. See Section 301(b) (1) in the Appendix.
33. Compare § 102(b) with § 301. See full text in the Appendix.
34. See Appendix for full text.
35. See section 101 in the Appendix.
36. See Appendix for full text.
37. Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.Cas. 815, 867, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 701 (1854).
38. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 408-409
(S.D.N.Y. 1917).
39. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1945).
Subsection (a) of section 102 declares that "[c]opyright protec-
tion subsists .. . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression. .. 40 Seven (7) illustrative
categories of "works of authorship" are identified. 4 1 Then, in an
evident desire to define those "original works of authorship" in
which copyright protection cannot subsist, subsection (b) of sec-
tion 102 declares:
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.
Subsection (b) of section 102 is misleading, if not incorrect.
Clearly, "[c]opyright in a work does not prevent others from
using the information it contains, from employing the systems it
explains or from constructing the devices it describes. '42 How-
ever, copyright does protect an original work of authorship
which contains information which explains a system, or which
describes a device, when the work containing these non-
protectible elements is itself copied in toto or in substantial
part. A person reading a copyrighted book describing an ac-
counting system could safely copy the system and use it.4 3 But
such a person could not lawfully copy the copyrighted book
and publish the same as his own work in order to save himself
the trouble of having to restate the non-copyrightable system in
his own words.44
The poor draftsmanship in section 102(b) may create prob-
lems rather than resolve them. This confusion could have been
avoided had the entire phrase beginning with "regardless" been
deleted. 45 An early amendment is recommended.
Attention is now directed to the second example, of many, of
the vagaries and inconsistencies which beset the 1976 Copyright
Revision Act. Section 10146 instructs, inter alia, that:
[a] 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement. . . art reproduc-
tion .. .or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted .... (emphasis supplied)
Section 106 informs us: "Subject to sections 107 through 118,
40. See section 102 in the Appendix.
41. See note 15 supra.
42. A.S. KATZ, Copyright Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings and
Designs, 19 LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 224, 240 (1954) and cases cited therein.
43. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S..99 (1879).
44. See, e.g., Fitch v. Young, 230 F. 743, 745-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
45. This might be an excellent area for early amendment.
46. See full text of section 101 in the Appendix.
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the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights ... (2) to pre-
pare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. ... "
Further, section 102(a)(5) indicates that "pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works", of "original works of authorship" are
copyrightable subject matter. In discussing this portion of the
then pending Bill, the 1966 Report of the House of Representa-
tives47 stated
...the definition of 'pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' car-
ries with it no implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or
intrinsic quality. The term is intended to comprise everything now
covered by classes (f) through (k) of section 5 in the present statute,
including not only 'works of art' in the traditional sense but also
works of graphic art and illustration, art reproductions, plans and
drawings, photographs and reproductions of them, maps, charts,
globes, and other cartographic works, works of these kinds intended
for use in advertising and commerce, and works of 'applied art.' (em-
phasis supplied)
For example, architectural plans, drawings and designs fall
within class (i) of section 5 of the present Copyright Law. 48 It is
clear that these architectural works were encompassed within
subsection (5) of section 102(a) of the 1966 Bill. However, the
emphasized portion was deleted from the related section of the
1976 House Report. 4 The retention of "plans and drawings" in
the 1976 House Report, while less clear, suggests that architec-
tural plans, drawings, designs and related three dimensional
models50 remain within the purview of the Act.
Inasmuch as the above cited sections appear to grant the
proprietor of copyrighted architectural plans, drawings and de-
signs the exclusive right to make derivative works from these
plans, etc., it would appear to follow that the Act now grants the
architectural copyright proprietor the exclusive right to build
the house, office building or other three dimensional structure
embodied within his two dimensional plans, etc. If so, this would
47. On October 12,1966 the HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th CONG., 2d
SESS., issued its REPORT No. 2237 on H.R. 4347, the then current version of the
Bill for the general revision of the Copyright Law (Title 17 U.S.. . .). [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1966 HOUSE REPORT]. The portion quoted is at p. 46 of the Report.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 5(i); Regulations of the Copyright Office, 37 C.F.R. § 202.12(a)
(1976).
49. HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 54.
50. To the extent that an architectural work is a work of art, 17 U.S.C. § l(b)
gives the copyright proprietor the exclusive right ". . . to complete, execute, and
finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art."
be a signal advance in the protection of architects. The architect
would now have copyright protection in the edifice itself, a right
he enjoys, for instance, under the Stockholm Convention," and
under the United Kingdom Copyright Act.52 Such an interpreta-
tion would lay to rest, once and for all, the pesky question of
whether an architect "publishes" his plans, etc. eo instanti he
files them of public record in order to obtain the necessary
construction permits and financing. It would further avoid the
problem of educating the courts to recognize that one who sub-
stantially copies from the completed structure and then com-
mits this copying to a drawing or plan has committed copyright
infringement by indirect copying. Over the years, commencing
in 1954, the law on these two issues has steadily evolved in favor
of the architect;5 however, there are jurisdictions which still
live in the Dark Ages.54
Unfortunately, the fourth general revision of the Copyright
Law, as represented by the 1976 Act, fails to meet the pressing
needs of architects and others who concretely conceptualize
plans, drawings and designs for useful works and, thereafter,
cause such plans, etc. to be transformed into useful, three di-
mensional structures. Instead of forthrightly granting an ar-
chitect the express exclusive derivative right to build the struc-
ture embodied in his plans, etc., the Act, in section 113(b) 55 lets
this important derivative right dangle unresolved, enmeshed in
a plethora of unclear and vacillating verbiage:
This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that
portrays a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with
respect to the making, distribution, or display of the useful article so
portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether
title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State in effect on December
31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action
brought under this title. (emphasis supplied)
This is legislative abdication most foul! Everything is back to
51. Stockholm Copyright Convention, 1967, Arts. 2 and 9. (Berne Union,
The International Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works).
52. United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 1, c.74, §§ 3(1) (b) & 48.
See also, COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 710-12, pp. 295-96 (11th
ed. 1971).
53. See KATZ note 42 supra and cases cited therein; see, e.g., May v. Bray,
30 Copy.Off.Bull. 435 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 804, 345
P.2d 546, 123 U.S.P.Q. 463 (1959); Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 197
N.E. 2d 886, 141 U.S.P.Q. 454 (Mass. 1964); Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging
Steel Service, Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 177 U.S.P.Q. 353 (8th Cir. 1973); Scholz Homes v.
Maddox, 397 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1967). See also 3 A.L.R. Fed. 793.
54. See KATZ, supra note 42 at 233, n.51-53; cf. Fotomat Corp. v. Photo
Drive Thru, 425 F. Supp. 693, 706-07 n.13-14 (D.N.J. 1977).
55. See Appendix for full text of section 113.
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"Square One." An architect's derivative rights, if any, under the
Act would depend on a federal court's interpretation of state
law, on a case by case basis. This can only perpetuate bad
precedents-and continue the lack of uniformity which the Act
is designed, ostensibly, to avoid.
The rationale behind the Act's peculiar stance on pictorial,
graphic or sculptural works is found in the House Report.56
The broad language of section 106(1) and of subsection (a) of section
113 raises questions as to the extent of copyright protection for a
pictorial, graphic, or scuptural work that portrays, depicts, or repre-
sents an image of a useful article in such a way that the utilitarian
nature of the article can be seen. To take the example usually cited,
would copyright in a drawing or model of an automobile give the artist
the exclusive right to make automobiles of the same design?57
The 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights stated, on the basis of
judicial precedent, that 'copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work, portraying a useful article as such, does not extend to the manu-
facture of the useful article itself,' and recommended specifically that
'the distinctions drawn in this area by existing court decisions' not be
altered by the statute. The Register's Supplementary Report, at page
48, cited a number of these decisions, and explained the insuperable
difficulty of finding 'any statutory formulation that would express the
distinction satisfactorily.' Section 113(b) reflects the Register's conclu-
sion that 'the real need is to make clear that there is no intention to
change that present law with respect to the scope of protection in a
work portraying a useful article as such.'
It is respectfully suggested that there is a vast difference be-
tween the making of automobiles, which are turned out in the
millions each year, and the construction of one of a kind three
dimensional structures, or the construction of a limited number
of homes built from an architect's copyrighted design.
The foregoing examples aside, the Act creates much uncer-
tainty in its efforts to establish federal preemption over the
regulation of all copyrightable works. Despite Congress' repre-
sentations that it seeks clarity, the language of sections 301 and
302 is muddied and unclear.
Section 301 of the Act is a key section in the Act, dealing, as it
does, with federal preemption.58 Its evolution, and the underly-
56. HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 105.
57. See, Rolls Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 689,
692-93 (N.D. Ga. 1977), wherein the court reviewed copyright protection aspects
of automobile design in granting protection akin to trademark in the distinctive
grill and hood ornament and the Rolls Royce under the Lanham Act, 15 USC §
1051 et. seq.
58. The HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 130-31 declares:
ing legislative reports relating thereto, confirm this writer's
opinion that section 301, as enacted into law, creates more prob-
lems than it solves. Thus, Senate Bill S.1361, 59 a precursor of
S.22, which bill became the new Act declared in subsection (b)
that:
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under
the common law or statutes of any State with respect to:
(1) unpublished material that does not come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including
works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion;
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced
before January 1, 1975;
(3) activities violating rights that are not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106, including breaches of contract, breaches of trust,
invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices
such as passing off and false representation. (emphasis supplied)
Senate Report No. 93-98360 which accompanied S.1361 dis-
cussed section 301(b) as follows: 61
The numbered clauses of subsection (b) list three general areas left
unaffected by the preemption: (1) unpublished material outside the
subject matter of copyright; (2) causes of action arising under State
law before the effective date of the statute; and (3) violations of rights
that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights under copyright.
The intention of Section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights
under the common law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to
copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope of the
Federal copyright law. The declaration of this principle in section 301 is
intended to be stated in the clearest and most unequivocal language
possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its
unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively, and to av-
oid the development of any vague borderline areas between State and
Federal protection.
Under section 301(a) all 'legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106' are governed exclusively by the Federal
copyright statute if the works involved are 'works of authorship that
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103.' All
corresponding State laws, whether common law or statutory, are
preempted and abrogated. Regardless of when the work was cre-[131]
ated and whether it is published or unpublished, disseminated or un-
disseminated, in the public domain or copyrighted under the Federal
statute, the States cannot offer it protection equivalent to copyright.
Section 1338 of title 28, United States Code, also makes clear that any
action involving rights under the Federal copyright law would come
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts. The preemptive
effect of section 301 is limited to State laws; as stated expressly in
subsection (d) of section 301, there is no intention to deal with the
question of whether Congress can or should offer the equivalent of
copyright protection under some constitutional provision other than
the patent-copyright clause of article 1, section 8.
59. S.1361 was passed by the Senate on July 3, 1974 at the 2d Session of the
93d Congress. This Bill was introduced by Senator McClellan at the 1st Session
of the 93d Congress, on March 26, 1973.
60. Calendar No. 946, 93d Congress, 2d Session, July 3, 1974.
61. S. REP. No. 93-983, 93d CONG., 2d SESS. at 166.
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Clause (1) is limited to unpublished material to make clear that there is
no intention to change the established doctrine of Wheaton v. Peters,
protection in a work terminates upon its publication. Use of the word
unpublished avoids any implication that the common law equivalent
to copyright, for material outside the subject matter of the statute,
might continue after 'publication' as that term is defined in section
101. (emphasis supplied)
S.1361 was followed by S.22.62 Section 301(b) now read as
follows:
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under
the common law or statutes of any State with respect to:
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of
authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) Any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced
before January 1, 1977; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equiva-
lent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106, including rights against mis-
appropriation not equivalent to any of such exclusive rights,
breaches of contract, breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, inva-
sion of privacy, defamation, and deception [sic] trade practices
such as passing off and false representation; or
(4) sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972. (emphasis
supplied)
The House Report,63 in analyzing S.22, as it concerned subsec-
tion (b) of section 301, deleted all reference to the material
quoted above from Senate Report No. 93-983 and, in its place,
substituted the following:
The numbered clauses of subsection (b) list three general areas left
unaffected by the preemption: (1) subject matter that does not come
within the subject of copyright; (2) causes of action arising under State
law before the effective date of the statute; and (3) violations of rights
that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights under copyright.
The examples in clause (3), while not exhaustive, are intended to
illustrate rights and remedies that are different in nature from the
rights comprised in a copyright and that may continue to be protected
under State common law or statute. The evolving common law rights
of 'privacy,' 'publicity,' and trade secrets, and the general laws of
defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the causes
of action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a
breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from
62. S.22 was introduced by Senator McClellan at the 1st Session of the 94th
Congress, on January 15, 1975. On November 20, 1975 it was reported by Mr.
McClellan with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Subsection (b) of
Section 301, as quoted in this article, is found in said substitute.
63. HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 132; U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6177-78.
copyright infringement. Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights
of parties to contract with each other and to sue for breaches of
contract; however, to the extent that the unfair competition concept
known as 'interference with contract relations' is merely the equiva-
lent of copyright protection, it would be preempted.
The last example listed in clause (3)-deceptive trade practices such
as passing off and false representation-represents an effort to distin-
guish between those causes of action known as 'unfair competition'
that the copyright statute is not intended to preempt and those that it
is. Section 301 is not intended to preempt common law protection in
cases involving activities such as false labeling, fraudulent represen-
tation, and passing off even where the subject matter involved comes
within the scope of the copyright statute.
'Misappropriation' is not necessarily synonymous with copyright
infringement, and thus a cause of action labeled as 'misappropriation'
is not preempted if it is in fact based neither on a right within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 nor on a right
equivalent thereto. For example, state law should have the flexibility
to afford a remedy (under traditional principles of equity) against a
consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of
the facts (i.e., not the literary expression) constituting 'hot' news,
whether in the traditional mold of International News Service v. As-
sociated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) or in the newer form of data updates
from scientific, business, or financial data bases. Likewise, a person
having no trust or other relationship with the proprietor of a com-
puterized data base should not be immunized from sanctions against
electronically or cryptographically breaching the proprietor's securi-
ty arrangements and accessing the proprietor's data. The unau-
thorized data access which should be remediable might also be
achieved by the intentional interception of data transmissions by wire,
microwave or laser transmissions, or by the common unintentional
means of 'crossed' telephone lines occasioned by errors in switching.
The proprietor of data displayed on the cathode ray tube of a com-
puter terminal should be afforded protection against unauthorized
printouts by third parties (with or without improper access), even if
the data are not copyrightable. For example, the data may not be
copyrighted because they are not fixed in a tangible medium of
expression (i.e., the data are not displayed for a period or [sic] not
more than transitory duration).
It is to be noted that S.22 deleted the intial phrase "unpub-
lished material" in section 301(b)(1) and substituted the phrase
"subject matter". The amended language thus indicated that
there was no federal preemption with respect to "subject matter
that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103. .. "6 The House Report6"
gives no reason for the change. Why not? The change is impor-
tant.
An examination of the text of section 301 reveals that S.22 was
again amended before passage. This time section 301 was
changed materially by the deletion of all illustrative examples
64. For the complete text of sections 102 and 103 see Appendix
65. HousE REPORT note 4 supra at 132.
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of non-copyright causes of action which were not affected by
the federal preemption of the Act. The deletion was made in the
Committee of Conference of the Senate and House. The follow-
ing cryptic statement is found in the House Conference
Report: 6
6
The House bill deleted the clause of section 301(b)(3) enumerating
illustrative examples of causes of action, such as certain types of
misappropriation, not preempted under section 301....
No reasons are given. What was wrong with illustrating types of
actions available in state forums for the redressing of injuries to
intellectual productions not otherwise protectible under
copyright principles? Why the earlier unexplained deletion
from section 301 (b)(1) of the reference to "unpublished mate-
rial"?6 7 Are these deletions intended to broaden or to narrow
federal preemption? What works came within the scope of the
Act? A nice series of questions, particularly in light of the fol-
lowing quotation from the House Report:68
The preemption of rights under State law is complete with respect to
any work coming within the scope of the bill, even though the scope of
exclusive rights given the work under the bill is narrower than the
scope of common law rights in the work might have been.
The foregoing quotation, when read with that portion of the
House Report set out above,69 makes one wonder whether there
might not be a bit of self indulgent puffery in the House Report's
observation that the principle of preemption in section 301 was
* . stated in the clearest and most unequivocal language pos-
sible. .... ,70
What does section 301 mean? Two decades of legislative tink-
ering have made the Act, in general, and section 301 in particu-
lar, less than lucid. Certainly, when one examines section 301 in
its S.1361 form 71 one can see a certain clear cut rationale. It
appears section 301 was designed to limit state court jurisdic-
tion to the regulation of only two classes of intellectual works:
(1) copyrightable works not yet eligible for protection under
the Federal Copyright Law, e.g., works which have not yet been
66. HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT note 15 supra at 79.
67. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
68. HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 131.
69. Id. at 130-31.
70. Id.
71. See notes 58 and 59 supra.
"fixed" and hence have not yet been "created" for the purposes
of Federal Law, and (2) non-copyrightable works, e.g., those
which do not come within the scope of the Federal Copyright
Law.
Within the class of non-copyrightable works one finds such
commercially important intellectual productions as: "literary
characters"; "slogans/jingles"; "titles"; "advertising and promo-
tion ideas"; "ideas/synopses/formats for motion pictures, televi-
sion series, books, songs and plays. '72 Certainly, section 301 (b)
(1) of S.13617 3 would have presented no questions of interpreta-
tion. S.1361 excluded non-copyrightable works from the pre-
emptive grasp of federal copyright law as long as such works
remained unpublished material. However, the Act deleted the
reference to unpublished works. Now the certainty is gone.
The effort of the House Report 74 to explain section 301 (b) only
complicates matters:
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter
categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from
protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright
because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or
because it has fallen into the public domain. On the other hand, sec-
tion 301(b) explicitly preserves common law copyright protection for
one important class of works: works that have not been 'fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.' (emphasis supplied)
Which works fit within sections 102 and 103? And when is a
work, other than a slogan or title "too minimal. . . to qualify"
for copyright protection? Further what about the concept of
"publication" as affecting a work's eligibility forprotection un-
der state law?
The House Report has this to say about "publication"7 5 :
'Publication,' perhaps the most important single concept under the
present law, also represents its most serious defect.
72. "Literary characters," as that term is used in this article, means ver-
balized descriptions of personae, as opposed to artistic illustrations of such
personae. Thus, an oral or written description of Hercules would describe a
literary character of the "Superman" type. Such a literary character qua
character is not copyrightable. A cartoon strip drawing of "Clark Kent-
Superman," is copyrightable, not as a literary character, but as a two dimen-
sional drawing, or a three dimensional doll. So, too with Mickey Mouse.
However, a substantial taking of the copyrighted story materials of
"Clark Kent-Superman" would be a copyright infringement.
With reference to "slogans, etc.," see, e.g.., Regulations of the Copyright Of-
fice, 37 C.F.R. § 202.1; see also Copyright Office Circulars Nos. 34, 40C, 47 and
48B. The non-copyrightability of these works is so well established that the cases
thereon are legion.
73. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
74. HouSE REPORT note 4 supra at 131.
75. Id. at 129-130, 138.
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[p. 130]
Although at one time, when works were disseminated almost exclu-
sively through printed copies, 'publication' could serve as a practical
dividing line between common law and statutory protection, this is no
longer true. With the development of the 20th century communica-
tions revolution, the concept of publication has become increasingly
artificial and obscure. To cope with the legal consequences of an
established concept that has lost much of its meaning and justifica-
tion, the courts have given 'publication' a number of diverse interpre-
tations, some of them radically different. Not unexpectedly, the re-
sults in individual cases have become unpredictable and often unfair.
A single Federal system would help to clear up this chaotic situation.
Enactment of section 301 would also implement the 'limited times'
provisions of the Constitution, which has become distorted under the
traditional concept of 'publication.' Common law protection in 'un-
published' works is now perpetual, no matter how widely they may be
disseminated by means other than 'publication'; the bill would place a
time limit on the duration of exclusive rights in them. The provision
would also aid scholarship and the dissemination of historical mate-
rials by making unpublished, undisseminated manuscripts available
for publication after a reasonable period.
[p. 138]
Although 'publication' would no longer play the central role as-
signed to it under the present law, the concept would still have
substantial significance under provisions throughout the bill, includ-
ing those on Federal preemption and duration. Under the definition
in section 101, a work is 'published' if one or more copies or
phonorecords embodying it are distributed to the public-that is, gen-
erally to persons under no explicit or implicit restrictions with respect
to disclosure of its contents-without regard to the manner in which
the copies or phonorecords changed hands. The definition clears up
the question of whether the sale of phonorecords constitutes publica-
tion, and it also makes plain that any form or [sic] dissemination in
which a material object does not change hands-performances or
displays on television, for example-is not a publication no matter
how many people are exposed to the work. On the other hand, the
definition also makes clear that, when copies or phonorecords are
offered to a group of wholesalers, broadcasters, motion pictures, etc.,
publication takes place if the purpose is 'further distribution, public
performance, or public display.' (emphasis supplied) [p. 138]
A reading of section 301(b)(1) of the Act might suggest, at first
blush, that state courts have original and non-exclusive jurisdic-
tion76 to regulate rights and remedies in cases concerning all
* non-copyrightable works. However, in light of the evolution of
76. As a practical matter state court jurisidiction over common law cases
would be exclusive of the Federal District Courts. However, where federal
jurisdiction was based upon diversity principles (U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, Cl. 1; 28
U.S.C. § 1332) common law cases would be brought in Federal District Courts.
section 301(b)(1) of the Act, this does not appear to be a certain-
ty. Only unpublished and non-fixed non-copyrightable works
are clearly within the jurisdiction of the states. One example
should suffice to illustrate this point:
"W", a writer, conceives a concretely expressed idea for the format
of a television series. W's format is based on making an English lan-
guage dramatic adaptation of a foreign language, public domain non-
dramatic literary work. W writes the idea down on a piece of paper. He
submits the paper containing his concretely expressed television
series format idea to "P", a producer, with the understanding that if
the idea is used W will be paid X dollars. P submits the written idea to
several networks to ascertain their interest in the idea. Several bid for
the television format idea.
Has W created a work within the scope of the Act? Certainly it is
"fixed," pursuant to section 101.77 Is it a "publication", under
section 101?78 If it is both, is it within the subject matter of
copyright, pursuant to sections 102 and 103? If it is-but ". . . it
fails to achieve federal statutory copyright because it is too
minimal. . . to qualify", 79 then "the bill [Act] prevents the states
from protecting it. ... 0 W is in legal limbo. His commercially
viable idea is now unprotectible at both the state and federal
level. Is this any way to protect an author?
The reason for this sorry situation is again poor drafting,
coupled, this time, with an inability to clearly perceive the con-
cept of publication. The House Report has observed 8' that "...
a work [which can fit] within one of the general subject matter
categories of sections 102 and 103"-and thus be copyrightable
subject matter regulated solely under the Act-can, neverthe-
less, be denied protection by the states, and by the federal gov-
ernment under the Act, if the work ". . . fails to achieve federal
statutory copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in origi-
nality to qualify, or because it has fallen into the public domain"
such an observation is a most unsettling one.
Does the House Report's observation mean that a detailed
written synopsis of a concretely expressed idea for a television
series (which synopsis may be only a few pages) and which has
been distributed to several television sources to solicit possible
sales, is a work which could fall within sections 102 and 103, but
which is not protectible under the Act as being "too minimal"?
Does the House Report's observation mean that a written
77. See Appendix for text of section 101.
78. Id.
79. HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 131; see also note 61 supra and accom-
panying text.
80. HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 131.
81. Id. at 130-131, see note 58 supra.
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slogan separately submitted, or contained within a written pres-
entation of a concretely expressed idea for an advertising cam-
paign, and submitted to several interested parties to solicit pos-
sible clients to use the same, is copyrightable subject matter
which cannot be protected under the Act because it is "too
minimal"? Or are both works truly noncopyrightable, but be-
cause they were "published" they cannot be given "protection
equivalent to copyright"? 82 But can they be given protection
under state law? And if so, what kind? Is this the way to state
the preemptive intent of Congress "in the clearest and most
unequivocal language possible"?
83
The Act's treatment of the concept of publication only adds to
the chaos. It does this "by failing to recognize that publication as
used in the law of intellectual productions is a word of art. '84
"There is a distinction between 'publication' for purposes of
exploitation and 'publication' for purposes of creating or de-
stroying legal rights. The two are not synonymous, yet there are
instances when the one act of publication will have both conno-
tations . ,,"s Thus, only the unqualified distribution to the
public of copies of a work subject to statutory copyright regu-
lation will be a publication in the exploitation sense and also a
publication in the legal sense, so that unless done in accordance
with the requirements of the statute, legal rights in the work will
be destroyed.
Drone, the dean of American copyright commentators, has
stated that in order.to determine whether a creator's common
law rights in his work are terminated by its publication ". . . two
tests are to be applied: 1, whether there is any statute relating to
the species of production for which protection is sought, or
governing the kind of right which is claimed; 2, whether the
work has been published within the meaning of the statute
" 86
It follows from the foregoing that it serves only a destructive
purpose to restrict state protection of non-copyrightable works
to "unpublished materials." "Publication" as a word of art has
82. Id.
83. Id. at 130.
84. A.S. KATZ, The Publication of Intellectual Productions-A Common
Sense Approach, 30 So. CALIF. LAW REV. 48, 49 n.6 (1956).
85. Id. at 49.
86. DRONE ON COPYRIGHT 118 (1879).
absolutely no bearing upon those categories of works which are
not within the scope of federal copyright law. This important
point was brought home by Chief Justice Burger in the tape
piracy case, Goldstein v. California,7 when he wrote:
Petitioners place great stress on their belief that the records or tapes
which they copied had been 'published.' We have no need to determine
whether, under state law, these recordings had been published or
what legal consequences such publication might have. For purposes
of federal law, 'publication' serves only as a term of the art which
defines the legal relationships which Congress has adopted under the
federal copyright statutes. As to categories of writings which Con-
gress has not brought within the scope of the federal statute, the term
has no application. (Court's emphasis)
Consonant with the foregoing it is recommended that clause
(1) of section 301(b) of the Act be amended to read as follows:
[301(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to:]
(1) any material traditionally not protected by statutory
copyright, such as literary characters, slogans, jingles, titles, adver-
tising and promotion ideas, and ideas, synopses and formats of
works of authorship falling within Sections 102 and 103 of the Act
whether the same be published or unpublished; and copyrightable
works not yet fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
As amended, clause (1) of section 301(b), when applied in
conjunction with the salutary equity and contract provisions of
clause (3), should lay to final rest the spectre of publication
which has long plagued works not within the scope of federal
statutory copyright. The amendment would also make it crystal
clear that Sears and Compco 88 do not bar state protection of
such non-copyrightable works under principles of unfair com-
petition law, provided such state action is not designed as a
subterfuge to protect a work clearly within sections 301 and 302
but failing to obtain or maintain federal statutory protection.
III. DURATION OF THE RIGHTS GRANTED
Perhaps the most beneficial provisions of the Act, from the
point of view of the economic well being of authors, are those
found in sections 302 through 305. A brief description of these
sections was given in the INTRODUCTION portion of this article.8 9
This portion of the article will examine these sections in greater
depth.
To ". . . authors and their representatives . . . the adoption of
a life-plus-50 term was by far the most important legislative goal
87. 412 U.S. 546, 570 n.28 (1973).
88. Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
89. See pp. 175-76 supra and Appendix for full text of sections 302 through
305.
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in copyright revision." 9° The Register of Copyrights regarded
this term "... as the foundation of the entire bill [the present
Act]."g1
Section 302 of the Act deals with the duration of copyright for works
created on or after January 1, 1978.92 In summary, it provides:
(a): Copyright subsists from the work's "creation" 93 and con-
tinues for a term consisting of the author's life and 50 years
after his or her death.
(b): Copyright in a jointly authored work lasts until 50 years
after the death of the last surviving joint author.
(c): Copyright in anonymous 95 and pseudonymous 96 works,
and in works made for hire9 7 lasts 75 years from first publica-
tion98 of the work or 100 years from creation, whichever expires
first. If, with reference to anonymous and pseudonymous
works, one or more of the authors are identified, and the appro-
priate data recorded in the Copyright Office, then the copyright
in such cases will last for the life of the author (or last surviving
joint author) so identified and 50 years. 99
(d): Copyright Office records relating to the death of authors
are provided for and regulated. 10 0
(e): A presumption as to an author's death is created.' The
section is silent whether the presumption is conclusive or re-
buttable and the House Report does not elaborate on this as-
pect.10 2 However, this writer is persuaded such a presumption
was intended to be rebuttable.
0 3
90. HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 133.
91. Id.
92. See Appendix for full text of Section 302.
93. See section 101 in Appendix for the definition of "creation".
94. The Act does not define the terms "author" or "joint authors". Section
101 defines a "joint work"; see Appendix.
95. See section 101 in Appendix for the definition of "anonymous".
96. See s~ction 101 in Appendix for the definition of "pseudonymous".
97. See section 101 in Appendix for the definition of "work made for hire."
See also sections 201 and 202 in the Appendix.
98. See section 101 in Appendix for definition of term "publication".
99. See section 302(c) in Appendix. See also HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at
137.
100. 'See section 302(d) in Appendix. See also HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at
138.
101. See section 302(e) in Appendix.
102. HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 138.
103. The Federal Rules of Evidence are contained within Pub. L. No. 93-595,
88 Stat. 1926, signed into law by President Gerald Ford on January 2, 1975,
effective date, July 1, 1975. Rule 301 declares: ,
Section 303 of the Act concerns the duration of copyright works
created, but not published, before January 1, 1978.104 Specifically
section 303 deals with the granting of preemptive statutory pro-
tection under the Act to existing works now enjoying perpetual
protection under common law principles. 10 5 As the House Re-
port notes: 10 6
. . . section 303 would have a genuinely restrictive effect. Its basic
purpose is to substitute statutory for common law copyright for every-
thing now protected at common law, [here again unclear language:
slogans, titles, program ideas inter alia, are protected at common law,
but are not subjects of copyright] and to substitute reasonable time
limits for the perpetual protection now available ...
Thus, for copyrightable works now protected at common law,
e.g., a play being performed from an unpublished text (the
making of copies for cast and stage crew use only is not a
"publication"), 10 7 statutory copyright shall subsist from Jan-
uary 1, 1978, and shall endure for the life of the author plus
50 years, or in the case of an unpublished anonymous,
pseudonymous work or works made for hire, the statutory
copyright endures for 100 years from creation.
Some nice constitutional questions would be raised were the
Rule 301. Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings.
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act
of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom in is directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut ,or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which re-
mains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast.
Rule 302 declares:
Rule 302. Applicability of State Law in Civil Actions and Proceed-
ings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respect-
ing a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with State
law.
See also, §§ 600-607 California Evidence Code. Section 602 makes clear that
under the law of California a statutory presumption, as in Section 302(e) of the
Act, is a rebuttable presumption.
104. See section 303 in Appendix.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 2 of the present Copyright Act declares:
§ 2. RIGHTS OF AUTHOR OR PROPRIETOR OF UNPUB-
LISHED WORK.-Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or
limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at
common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of
such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages
therefor.
106. HOUSE REPORT note 4 at 139.
107. The present Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., does not define "publi-
cation", but it does define the "date of publication" as ". . . the earliest date
when copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold or publicly
distributed by the proprietor of the copyright or under his authority." 17 U.S.C.
§ 26. See also Copyright Office Circular No. 48 re: Dramatico-Musical Works.
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government to terminate the perpetual rights held by a propri-
etor of an unpublished work without giving an adequate quid
pro quo in return. The constitutional issue turns on whether
there would be such a "taking" of the property concerned, by
limiting its term of protection, as to place such an author in a
position different from that accorded authors of works in which
copyrights presently subsist, or in which copyrights would sub-
sist in the future. In short, in violation of the fifth amendment to
the Constitution, an improper limited extension of statutory
protection in lieu of perpetual common law protection could
constitute an unlawful taking of property without due process
of law and also could constitute a denial of equal protection of
the laws to the proprietors of copyrightable works presently
enjoying perpetual common law protection."0 8
The constitutional question is resolved in section 303 as fol-
lows: federal statutory copyright subsists from January 1, 1978,
and endures for the life of the author plus fifty years as set forth
in section 302. To cover those few cases where the substituted
statutory term would be of little economic advantage to the
author, or to his family, section 303 specifically declares:
In no case, however, shall the term of copyright in such a work
expire before December 31, 2002; and, if the work is published on or
before December 31, 2002, the term of copyright shall not expire be-
fore December 31, 2027.
The foregoing provision ensures protection under the statute
for not lest than twenty five years as measured from January 1,
1978, and, if the work is subsequently published, for not less
than fifty years from January 1, 1978.
Section 304 of the Act treats of the duration of copyright in subsist-
ing copyrights and of the termination of transfers and licenses affect-
ing rights of copyright proprietors in the renewal copyright, which
transfers and licenses were executed before January 1, 1978.109
(a): For all copyrights in their first term of copyright on
January 1, 1978, this subsection reenacts and preserves the re-
newal provision in the present Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24.
Thus, all existing first term copyrights, and all those secured
108. For.a fuller discussion of the constitutional issues, see A.E. KATZ, The
General Revision of the Copyright Law-From Bare Bones to Corpulence-A
Partial Overview, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 213 (1977).
109. See section 304 in Appendix.
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through December 31, 1977, continue under the present two tier
renewal system. The first term will last for 28 years. The
copyright must be renewed and extended to receive a second
term of protection. However, the renewal/extension term will
last for 47 years rather than the present 28 years, for a two term
total of 75 years. The last sentence of subsection (a) of section
304 declares:
[t]hat in default of the registration of such application for renewal
and extension, the copyright in any work shall terminate at the expira-
tion of twenty eight years from the date copyright was originally
secured.
It is respectfully submitted that the default provision is un-
necessarily regressive.
It is suggested that section 304 (a) of the Act be amended to
provide substantially as follows:
Should there be a default of registration of an application for renewal
and extension, then, in such event, the underlying copyright would be
renewed by the government on behalf of a national trust to be set up to
receive the royalities derived from the trust's continued exploitation
of such work. These royalties could be used, inter alia, to support
indigent authors and their families, or to endow useful projects de-
signed to advance the state of the arts, or to advance and encourage
legal studies in the field of intellectual property.
(b): All renewal copyrights in force on October 19, 1976 (the
day the Bill was signed into law) are automatically extended to
last for a term of 75 years as measured from the date the
copyright was first secured.
(c): This subsection permits an author, or if the author were
dead, those claiming through the author, to recapture rights in
the copyright by acting to terminate transfers and licenses ef-
fective in the extended renewal term where such transfers were
executed before January 1, 1978. The termination provisions are
convoluted, to say the least. An analysis of subsection (c) and its
myriad clauses would serve no useful purpose, since the exposi-
tion of the analysis would prove as lengthy as the provisions
themselves, or as complex as the House Reports' "explanations"
thereof." 0
Suffice it to say that the right of recapture must be exercised
"at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end
of fifty-six years from the date copyright was originally se-
cured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever is later.""'
110. HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 141-42. It is noted therein that each owner
of a reverted right is a tenant in common, thus each owner could independently
sell his or her share, or could use or license the work subject to an accounting to
the other co-owners. Imagine the problems this "splitting" of the copyright can
entail.
111. Section 304(c) (3) of the Act.
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Naturally, the right of recapture does not apply to works made
for hire. For the procedure concerning the termination of trans-
fers and licenses executed after January 1, 1978, see section 203
of the Act. 112 Note the time constrates in section 203(a)(3).
Section 305 of the Act deals with the terminal date in measuring
duration of copyright.113 All copyright terms set forth in sections
302 through 304 run to the end of the year in which they would
otherwise expire, a salutary provision which will make these
copyright terms easier to compute. It must be cautioned that
section 305 affects only "terms of copyright." Thus, the latter
section has no application to the copyright recapture proce-
dures in section 304 (c).1 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1976 Copyright Revision Act shows the effects of over two
decades of legal tinkering. As is the woeful wont of too many
lawyers, amendments have added verbiage rather than clarity
to the Act. As stated in the INTRODUCTION: "Too much of the
Act's critical language is opaque, convoluted and unclear."
' 5
Perhaps it is too late, but is is suggested that the draftsmen of
the Act could have profited from an examination of the United
Kingdom Copyright Act, 1956116 and the Stockholm Copyright
Convention of 1967 (Berne Union)." 7 These two statutes are
such paragons of clarity as to merit the cynosure of all percep-
tive legal draftsmen. Additionally, the more lucid portions of
the explanatory language contained in the 1966 and 1976 House
Reports"8 could be recast in condensed form and incorporated
into the text of the Act to good purpose. Failing such amend-
ment (exclusive of those suggested by the writer)"9 it will be
necessary to assure that the Regulations of the Copyright Office
interpreting the Act are drawn with great clarity and specifici-
112. For the House Report explanation's of this section, see HOUSE REPORT
note 4 supra at 124-28. See also section 203 in Appendix.
113. See section 305 in Appendix.
114. See HOUSE REPORT note 4 supra at 142. See also section 304 in Appen-
dix. The same applies to section 203(a)(3), see Appendix.
115. See notes 23 and 24 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 52 supra.
117. See note 51 supra.
118. See 1966 HOUSE REPORT note 47 and HOUSE REPORT note 4, supra. See
also SENATE REPORT note 61 and HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT note 15, supra.
119. See suggested amendments pp. 192 and 196 supra.
ty.120 Here, the clear and noncontradictory portions of the ex-
planatory language contained in the above noted House and
Senate Reports could be used to great advantage.'
21
As noted in the INTRODUCTION this article does not pre-
tend to analyze all portions of the Act. For example, the writer
has not discussed the codification in section 107 of the doctrine
of fair use, as such codified doctrine affects the exclusive rights
granted copyright owners under section 106. The writer has not
reviewed section 108, which endeavors to grant an author pro-
tection from the unrestricted copying of his or her works
through the use of photocopying machines in libraries. 122 Nor
has the "wisdom" of involving the government in the setting of
royalties payable for the recording of nondramatic musical
works under compulsory license as set forth in section 115 or for
the juke box performance of such works under section 116 been
discussed. These royalties will be regulated by the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, an independent legislative agency whose
structure and operations are detailed in chapter 8 of the Act,
sections 801 through 810. Neither has there been any discussion
120. As per a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 41 Fed. Reg. No. 221,
November 15, 1976, the Register of Copyrights informed the puiblic of her inten-
tion to amend 37 C.F.R. 201 et seq. by promulgating new regulations, §§201.9 and
201.10, to set up machinery to carry Section 304(c) of the Act into effect. The
writer wishes her well. Her task is not an easy one. An illustrative example of
such rulemaking, and its related problems, is found in the Regulatiqns concern-
ing "Recording of Notices of Identity and Signal Carriage Complement of Cable
Systems," 42 Fed. Reg. 15,065-068 (No. 53, March 18, 1977). Excerpts from the
text of this illustrative Regulation are found in the Appendix.
121. The legislative analyses of the various versions of the bills to revise the
Copyright Law and the legislative analyses of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act
far exceed in total words the Act itself. Normally, one looks to the legislative
analyses to interpret an act. In the instant case it might not be far fetched to
suggest that one must look to the Act in order to interpret the legislative anal-
yses.
122. The problem was highlighted in Williams & Wilkins Company v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) where the Court of Claims found that the
library copying of copyrighted professional journals did not constitute infringe-
ment. The problem remained unsolved when the United States Supreme Court
in a per curiam decision, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), affirmed the lower court decision
by a 4 to 4, vote, Mr. Justice Blackmun taking no part in the decision.
The HousE REPORT note 4 supra at 65-79. sets forth the rationale for sections
107 and 108. The HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, note 15 supra at 70-74, explains
why these sections in S.22 were amended in the form as they appear in the Act.
The HOUSE REPORT at 68-70 sets forth an "Agreement on Guidelines for Class-
room Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions" and at 70-72, the
HOUSE REPORT sets forth "Guidelines For Educational Uses of Music." The
HousE CONFERENCE REPORT at 72-74 sets forth "Guidelines For The Proviso Of
Subsection 108(G) (2)." A careful study of the foregoing Reports and related
Guidelines should make clear that whatever the intent of sections 107 and 108,
and whatever the meaning is accorded the words of these sections, the sections
will most assuredly provide fertile soil for the incubation of substantial litiga-
tion concerning their day to day application.
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of the definition of "audiovisual works ' 123 their distinctions
from "motion pictures"'124 and the impact on the videotape re-
cording industry by the granting of copyright protection to a
new genre of works called "audiovisual works". Further, the
writer has wisely skirted the quagmire for authors created by
section 111 which endeavors to resolve, insofar as "free televi-
sion" and "cable television" are concerned, the conflict between
the creators of copyrighted works and the broadcasting indus-
try. These critical areas of the Act call for serious analysis, some
of which has already begun.
125
This article will have served its purpose if it encourages schol-
arly controversy, if it persuades even one reader to look at the
Act with fresh insight, if it persuades even one reader to see that
the Act, on balance, ill serves the author, and if it causes such
reader to exclaim, as did the little lad in the fairy tale,'2 6 "Hey,
the Emperor is naked!" This article will have served its pur-
poses if even one reader learns that to succeed in the quest for
wisdom one must first get understanding.
127
It is the writer's considered opinion that the fourth general
revision of the copyright laws of the United States ill serves the
author, in that the Act is so poorly drafted and so unclear in its
material parts as to render it both a commercial nightmare and
a lawyer's dream. It is the writer's further considered opinion-
even were the Act considered a paragon of clarity-that two
decades of special interest pressures have warped the purposes
of the Act by subordinating the rights of the author to those of
the user of the author's work product.'2 8
123. See section 101 in Appendix.
124. See section 101 in Appendix.
125. See, e.g., A.E. Katz, The General Revision of the Copyright Law-
From Bare Bones to Corpulence-A Partial Overview, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 213
(1977). See also June 1977 lecture series by Professor Melville B. Nimmer,
author of NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT.
126. H.C. ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S CLOTHES.
127. See Proverbs IV: 7 quoted at page 1 of this article. The translation from
the original Hebrew is by this article's writer.
128. The purported "exclusive rights" of copyright owners in section 106 of
the Act are materially diluted by the "limitations" on such rights, and the
concessions granted to users, as enumerated in sections 107-18. One example
concerning recorded music succinctly illustrates this point. Under the present
copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § l(b), the copyright owner of a musical work controls
the exclusive right to arrange said work, whether the arrangement is for use in a
recording or otherwise. Under §115 (a)(2) of the Act the copyright owner has no
The tension between the creator of a work and the commer-
cial exploiter of that work has existed since that fateful day,
many millennia ago, when the first transaction took place be-
tween an author and the person acquiring rights in his work.
The "love-hate" relationship engendered by such tension will
continue: each party needs the other. However, an American
copyright act misconceives its constitutional purpose12 9 when it
exascerbates the tension between author and user by favoring,
even by one jot or tittle, the user over the author. And of this
vice the 1976 Copyright Revision Act stands condemned!
From the perspective of "authors' 130 there is something basi-
cally wrong with a Copyright Act which grants "Exclusive
Rights in Copyrighted Works" in one brief section,' 3 ' only to
systematically erode such rights through a lengthy series of
debilitating sections'32 materially destructive of an author's
creative and economic interests.
For the reasons hereinabove set forth the writer respectfully
submits that sections 301 through 305 of chapter 3 of the Act and
their interrelated sections, must be extensively clarified
by early amendment to assure to authors and their kin that no
man or woman who labors with head and heart should labor for
nought.133
further right to control the making of arrangements of the copyrighted work
where a compulsory license is issued for its recordation. Further, the arrange-
ment is not protectible as a "derivative work" (See Section 101 in Appendix)
unless the copyright owner consents. In effect, this has the copyright owner
bargaining against himself. To obtain copyright protection of another person's
arrangement of the copyright owner's musical work, the owner will be required
to buy back such arrangement. This adds insult to injury, as the copyright
owner cannot obtain a fee under the 1976 Act from the recording party as a
condition of granting him a right to arrange the owner's musical work.
129. See U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 8 set forth at the beginning of this article.
130. Id.
131. See section 106 in Appendix.
132. See, e.g., sections 107, 710 and sections 801-10 of the Act.
133. The author of intellectual productions creates a most special sort of
property:
i * * intellectual property is, after all, the only absolute possession
in the world. . . The man who brings out of nothingness some child of
his thought has rights therein which cannot belong to any other sort of
property . . . the inventor of a book or other contrivance of thought
holds his property as a God holds it, by the right of creation.
Nathaniel Shaler*
Back of the canvas that throbs the painter is hinted and hidden;
Into the statue that breathes the soul of the sculptor is bidden;
Under the joy that is felt lie the infinite issues of feeling;
Crowning the glory revealed is the glory that crowns the revealing.
The third of five stanzas of the poem, Indirection by Richard Realf*
* [As quoted in A.S. Katz, The Creative Process And The Law, THE JOURNAL OF
THE PRODUCERS GUILD OF AMERICA 9 at 11 (1968).]
Such special property deserves better protection than that accorded by the
1976 Copyright Revision Act.
[VOL. 4:171, 1977] 1976 Copyright Revision Act
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Appendix
PART ONE-SELECTED SECTIONS FROM THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
§ 101. Definitions
As used in this title, the following terms and their variant forms mean the
following:
An "anonymous work" is a work on the copies or phonorecords of which no
natural person is identified as author.
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices
such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accom-
panying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such
as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
The "best edition" of a work is the edition, published in the United States at
any time before the date of deposit, that the Library of Congress determines to
be most suitable for its purposes.
A person's "children" are that person's immediate offspring, whether legiti-
mate or not, and any children legally adopted by that person.
A "collective work" is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or
encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.
A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship. The term "compilation" includes collective works.
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. The term "copies" includes the material
object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
"Copyright owner", with respect to any one of the exclusive rights com-
prised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right.
A work is "created" when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first
time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has
been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and
where the work has been prepared in different versions, each version consti-
tutes a separate work.
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, con-
densation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations,
or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of au-
thorship, is a "derivative work".
A "device" "machine", or "process" is one now known or later developed.
To "display" a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means
of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the case
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images
nonsequentially.
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficient-
ly permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consist-
ing of sounds, images. or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for
purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously
with its transmission.
The terms "including" and "such as" are illustrative and not limitative.
A "joint work" is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole.
"Literary works" are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless
of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts,
phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.
"Motion pictures" are audiovisual works consisting of a series of related
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion,
together with accompanying sounds, if any.
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either
directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to
make the sounds accompanying it audible.
"Phonorecords" are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. The term "phonorecords" includes the material
object in which the sounds are first fixed.
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works": include two-dimensional and
three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints
and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams,
and models. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar
as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the
design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be iden-
tified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article.
A "pseudonymous work" is a work on the copies or phonorecords of which
the author is identified under a fictitious name.
"Publication" is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.
The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for
purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, con-
stitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of
itself constitute publication.
To perform or display a work "publicly" means-
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family
and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places
and at the same time or at different times.
"Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or-other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they
are embodied.
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"State" includes the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and any territories to which this title is made applicable by an Act of
Congress.
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive
license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright
or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is
limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.
A "transmission program" is a body of material that, as an aggregate, has
been produced for the sole purpose of transmission to the public in sequence
and as a unit.
To "transmit" a performance or display is to communicate it by any device
or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from
which they are sent.
The "United States", when used in a geographical sense, comprises the
several States, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and the organized territories under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government.
A "useful article.' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.
An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a "useful
article".
The authors "widow" or "widower" is the author's surviving spouse under
the law of the author's domicile at the time of his or her death. Whether or not
the spouse has later remarried.
A "work of the United States Government" is a work prepared by an officer
or employee of the United States Government as part of that person's official
duties
A "work made for hire" is-
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment: or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as
a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties.
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing
sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for publication as a
secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introduc-
ing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or as-
sisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial
illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements,
answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an
"instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for
publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities
§ 102. Subject Matter of Copyright. In General
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works:
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method or operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
§ 103. Subject matter of copyright: Compilations and derivative works
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compi-
lations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in
which such material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive
right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of,
and does not effect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of,
any copyright protection in the preexisting material.
§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary; musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
§ 113. Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
(a) Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the
exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
in copies under section 106 includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any
kind of article, whether useful or otherwise.
(b) This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays
a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making,
distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to
such works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a
State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a
court in an action brought under this tit Ie.
(c) In the case of a work lawfully reproduced in useful articles that have been
offered for sale or other distribution to the public, copyright does not include
any right to prevent the making, distribution, or display of pictures or photo-
graphs of such articles in connection with advertisements or commentaries
related to the distribution or display of such articles, or in connection with news
reports.
§ 201. Ownership of copyright
(a) INITIAL OWNERSHIP.-Copyright in a work protected under this title vests
initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are
coowners of copyright in the work.
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(b) WORKS MADE FOR HIRE.-In the case of a work made for hire, the employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for
purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in
a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.
(C) CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE WORKS.-Copyright in each separate con-
tribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as
a whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an
express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of
copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege
of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular col-
lective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work
in the same series.
(d) TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP.-
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part
by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be be-
queathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of
intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any
subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be trans-
ferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any
particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the
protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.
(e) INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER.-When an individual author's ownership of a
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously
been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any govern-
mental body or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate,
transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of
the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title.
§ 202. Ownership of copyright as distinct from ownership of material object
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright,
is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights
in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an
agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights
under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.
§ 203. Termination of transfers and licenses granted by the author
(a) CONDITIONS FOR TERMINATION.-In the case of any work other than a work
made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of
copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after
January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the
following conditions:
(1) In the case of a grant executed by one author, termination of the
grant may be effected by that author or, if the author is dead, by the person
or persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to
exercise a total of more than one-half of that author's termination interest.
In the case of a grant executed by two or more authors of a joint work,
termination of the grant may be effected by a majority of the authors who
executed it; if any of such authors is dead, the termination interest of any
such author may be exercised as a unit by the person or persons who,
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under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total
of more than one-half of that author's interest.
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, and
may be exercised, by his widow or her widower and his or her children or
grandchildren as follows:
(A) the widow or widower owns the author's entire termination
interest unless there are any surviving children or grandchildren of
the author, in which case the widow or widower owns one-half of the
author's interest;
(B) the author's surviving children, and the surviving children of
any dead child of the author, own the author's entire termination
interest unless there is a widow or widower, in which case the owner-
ship of one-half of the author's interest is divided among them;
(C) the rights of the author's children and grandchildren are in all
cases divided among them and exercised on a per stirpes basis ac-
cording to the number of such author's children represented; the
share of the children of a dead child in a termination interest can be
exercised only by the action of a majority of them.
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period
of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of
execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the
work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of
publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from
the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in
writing, signed by the number and proportion of owners of termination
interests required under clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, or by their
duly authorized agents, upon the grantee or the grantee's successor in title.
(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termination,
which shall fall within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of
this subsection, and the notice shall be served not less than two or
more than ten years before that date. A copy of the notice shall be
recorded in the Copyright Office before the effective date of termina-
tion, as a condition to its taking effect.
(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of serv-
ice, with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe
by regulation.
(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agree-
ment to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make
any future grant.
(b) EFFECT OF TERMINATION.-Upon the effective date of termination, all
rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the
author, authors, and other persons owning termination interests under clauses
(1) and (2) of subsection (a), including those owners who did not join in signing
the notice of termination under clause (4) of subsection (a), but with the follow-
ing limitations:
(1) A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after
its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after
the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work covered by the terminated grant.
(2) The future rights that will revert upon termination of the grant be-
come vested on the date the notice of termination has been served as
provided by clause (4) of subsection (a). The rights vest in the author,
authors, and other persons named in, and in the proportionate shares
provided by, clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a).
(3) Subject to the provisions of clause (4) of this subsection, a further
grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right covered by a
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terminated grant is valid only if it is signed by the same number and
proportion of the owners, in whom the right has vested under clause (2) of
this subsection, as are required to terminate the grant under clauses (1)
and (2) of subsection (a). Such further grant or agreement is effective with
respect to all of the persons in whom the right it covers has vested under
clause (2) of this subsection, including those who did not join in signing it.
If any person dies after rights under a terminated grant have vested in him
or her, that person's legal representatives, legatees, or heirs at law repre-
sent him or her for purposes of this clause.
(4) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right
covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective
date of the termination. As an exception, however, an agreement for such
a further grant may be made between the persons provided by clause (3) of
this subsection and the original grantee or such grantee's successor in title,
after the notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4) of
subsection (a).
(5) Termination of a grant under this section affects only those rights
covered by the grants that arise under this title, and in no way affects
rights arising under any other Federal, State, or foreign laws.
(6) Unless and until termination is effected under this section, the grant,
if it does not provide otherwise, continues in effect for the term of coyright
provided by this title.
§ 301. Preemption with respect to other laws
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equiva-
lent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. There-
after, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed
in any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before
January 1, 1978; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106.
(c) With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be
annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2047. The premptive provi-
sions of subsection (a) shall apply to any such rights and remedies pertaining to
any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced on and after Feb-
ruary 15, 2047. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 303, no sound record-
ing fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright under this title
before, on, or after February 15, 2047.
(d) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under any
other Federal statute.
§ 302. Duration of copyright: Works created on or after January 1, 1978
(a) IN GENERAL-Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978,
subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections,
endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the
author's death.
(b) JOINT WORKS.-In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more au-
thors who did not work for hire, the copyright endures for a term consisting of
the life of the last surviving author and fifty years after such last surviving
author and fifty years after such last surviving author's death.
(c) ANONYMOUS WORKS, PSUEDONMOUS WORKS, AND WORKS MADE FOR HIRE.-In
the case of an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made for
hire, the copyright endures for a term of seventy-five years from the year of its
first publication, or a term of one hundred years from the year of its creation,
whichever expires first. If, before the end of such term, the identity of one or
more of the authors of an anonymous or pseudonymous work is revealed in the
records of a registration made for that work under subsections (a) or (d) of
section 408, or in the records provided by this subsection, the copyright in the
work endures for the term specified by subsection (a) or (b), based on the life of
the author or authors whose identity has been revealed. Any person having an
interest in the copyright in an anonymous or pseudonymous work may at any
time record, in records to be maintained by the Copyright Office for that pur-
pose, a statement identifying one or more authors of the work; the statement
shall also identify the person filing it, the nature of that person's interest, the
source of the information recorded, and the particular work affected, and shall
comply in form and content with requirements that the Register of Copyrights
shall prescribe by regulation.
(d) RECORDS RELATING TO DEATH OF AUTHORS.-Any person having an interest in a
copyright may at any time record in the Copyright Office a statement of the date
of death of the author of the copyrighted work, or a statement that the author is
still living on a particular date. The statement shall identify the person filing it,
the nature of that person's interest, and the source of the information recorded,
and shall comply in form and content with requirements that the Register of
Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation. The Register shall maintain current
records of information relating to the death of authors of copyrighted works,
based on such recorded statements and, to the extent the Register considers
practicable, on data contained in any of the records of the Copyright Office or in
other reference sources.
(e) PRESUMPTION AS TO AUTHOR'S DEATH.-After a period of seventy-five years
from the year of first publication of a work, or a period of one hundred years
from the year of its creation, whichever expires first, any person who obtains
from the Copyright Office a certified report that the records provided by sub-
section (d) disclose nothing to indicate that the author of the work is living, or
died less than fifty years before, is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that
the author has been dead for at least fifty years. Reliance in good faith upon this
presumption shall be a complete defense to any action for infringement under
this title.
§ 303. Duration of copyright: Works created but not published or copyrighted before
January 1, 1978
Copyright in a work created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the
public domain or copyrighted, subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures for
the term provided by section 302. In no case, however, shall the term of
copyright in such a work expire before December 31, 2002; and, if the work is
published on or before December 31, 2002, the term of copyright shall not expire
before December 31, 2027.
§ 304. Duration of copyright: Subsisting copyrights
(a) COPYRIGHTS IN THEIR FIRST TERM ON JANUARY 1, 1978.-Any copyright, the
first term of which is subsisting on January 1, 1978, shall endure for twenty-
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eight years from the date it was originally secured: Provided, That in the case of
any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite work
upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or of
any work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or licen-
see of the individual author) or by an employer for whom such work is made for
hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and exten-
sion of the copyright in such work for the further term of forty-seven years
when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the
Copyright Office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expira-
tion of the original term of copyright: And provided further, That in the case of
any other copyrighted work, including a contribution by an individual author to
a periodical or to a cyclopedic or other composite work, the author of such
work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the
author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living,
then the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his or her next of kin
shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a
further term of forty-seven years when application for such renewal and exten-
sion shall have been made to the Copyright Office and duly registered therein
within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright: And
provided further, That in default of the registration of such application for
renewal and extension, the copyright in any work shall terminate at the expira-
tion of twenty-eight years from the date copyright was originally secured.
(b) COPYRIGHTS IN THEIR RENEWAL TERM OR REGISTERED FOR RENEWAL BEFORE
JANUARY 1, 1978.-The duration of any copyright, the renewal term of which is
subsisting at any time between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977,
inclusive, or for which renewal registration is made between December 31, 1976,
and December 31, 1977, inclusive, is extended to endure for a term of seventy-
five years from the date copyright was originally secured.
(c) TERMINATION OF TRANSFERS AND LICENSES COVERING EXTENDED RENEWAL
TERM.-In the case of any copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal term
of January 1, 1978, other than a copyright in a work made for hire, the exclusive
or nonexclusive grant of a transfer before January 1, 1978, by any of the persons
designated by the second proviso of subsection (a) of this section, otherwise than
by will, is subject to termination under the following conditions:
(1) In the case of a grant executed by a person or persons other than the
author, termination of the grant may be effected by the surviving person or
persons who executed it. In the case of a grant executed by one or more of the
authors of the work, termination of the grant may be effected, to the extent of
a particular author's share in the ownership of the renewal copyright, by the
author who executed it or, if such author is dead, by the person or persons
who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a
total of more than one-half of that author's termination interest.
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, and
may be exercised, by his widow or her widower and his or her children or
grandchildren as follows:
(A) the widow or widower owns the authors entire termination interest
unless there are any surviving children or grandchildren of the author, in
which case the widow or widower owns one-half of the author's interest;
(B) the author's surviving children, and the surviving children of any
dead child of the author, own the author's entire termination interest unless
there is a widow or widower, in which case the ownership of one-half of the
author's interest is divided among them;
(C) the rights of the author's children and grandchildren are in all cases
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divided among them and exercised on a per stirpes basis according to the
number of such author's children represented; the share of the children of a
dead child in a termination interest can be exercised only by the action of a
majority of them.
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of
five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was
originally secured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever is later.
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in writing
upon the grantee or the grantee's successor in title. In the case of a grant
executed by a person or persons other than the author, the notice shall be
signed by all of those entitled to terminate the grant under clause (1) of this
subsection, or by their duly authorized agents. In the case of a grant excuted
by one or more of the authors of the work, the notice as to any one author's
share shall be signed by that author or his or her duly authorized agent or, if
that author is dead, by the number and proportion of the owners of his or her
termination interest required under clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, or by
their duly authorized agents.
(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termination, which shall
fall within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this subsection, and
the notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years before
that date. A copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright Office
before the effective date of termination, as a condition of its taking effect.
(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service, with
requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.
(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agree-
ment to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any
future grant.
(6) In the case of a grant executed by a person or persons other than the
author, all rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grant
revert, upon the effective date of termination, to all of those entitled to termi-
nate the grant under clause (1) of this subsection. In the case of a grant
executed by one or more of the authors of the work, all of a particular author's
rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grant revert, upon
the effective date of termination, to that author or, if that author is dead, to the
persons owning his or her termination interest under clause (2) of this subsec-
tion, including those owners who did not join in signing the notice of termina-
tion under clause (4) of this subsection. In all cases the reversion of rights is
subject to the following limitations:
(A) A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its
termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the
termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work
covered by the terminated grant.
(B) The future rights that will revert upon termination of the grant be-
come vested on the date the notice of termination has been served as pro-
vided by clause (4) of this subsection.
(C) Where the author's rights revert to two or more persons under clause
(2) of this subsection, they shall vest in those persons in the proportionate
shares provided by that clause. In such a case, and subject to the provisions
of subclause (D) of this clause, a further grant, or agreement to make a
further grant, of a particular author's share with respect to any right co-
vered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is signed by the same number
and proportion of the owners, in whom the right has vested under this
clause, as are required to terminate the grant under clause (2) of this subsec-
tion. Such further grant or agreement is effective with respect to all of the
persons in whom the right it covers has vested under this subclause, includ-
ing those who did not join in signing it. If any person dies after rights under
a terminated grant have vested in him or her, that person's legal representa-
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tives, legatees, or heirs at law represent him or her for purposes of this
subclause
(D) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right
covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective
date of the termination. As an exception, however, an agreement for such a
further grant may be made between the author or any of the persons pro-
vided by the first sentence of clause (6) of this subsection, or between the
persons provided by subclause (C) of this clause, and the original grantee or
such grantees successor in title, after the notice of termination has been
served as provided by clause (4) of this subsection.
(E) Termination of a grant under this subsection affects only those rights
covered by the grant that arise under this title, and in no way affects rights
arising under any other Federal, State, or foreign laws.
(F) Unless and until termination is effected under this subsection, the
grant, if it does not provide otherwise, continues in effect for the remainder
of the extended renewal term.
§ 305. Duration of copyright: Terminal date
All terms of copyright provided by sections 302 through 304 run to the end of
the calendar year in which they would otherwise expire.
PART TWO-SELECTED EXCERPTS-COPYRIGHT OFFICE REGULATIONS
Title 37-Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights
CHAPTER II-COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
PART 201-GENERAL PROVISIONS
Recording of Notices of Identity and Signal Carriage
Complement of Cable Systems
AGENCY: Library of Congress, Copyright Office.
ACTION: Final Regulation.
SUMMARY: This regulation makes clear that the public records of the
Copyright Office are open to the recording of notices of identity and signal
carriage complement required to be made by cable systems under section
11l(d)(1) of Title 17 of the United States Code as amended by Pub. L. 94-553 (90
Stat. 2541), the Act for General Revision of the Copyright Law. The regulation
pertains to the nature of the document to be filed and the action to be taken by
the Copyright Office upon its receipt. The regulation is interim in nature and
may be modified and supplemented in further rulemaking proceedings.
EFFECTIVE DATE: March 18, 1977.
2. Additional information. Comments from copyright owners and broadcast
organizations urged that the regulation be modified to require the recording of
various items of information not referred to in the proposal. These included
such matters as: identifying and classifying signals as independent or network,
local or distant; telephone numbers of cable systems; channel numbers; time
periods of secondary carriage; dates of operation; and special information per-
taining to substituted programming.
The Copyright Office has considerable doubt whether it has statutory authori-
ty to require such information in initial notices required to be recorded by April
18, 1977. This doubt, coupled with the short time period remaining before the
initial filing deadline and the desirability of further exploration of the issues,
has led us to conclude we cannot require the recording of such additional
information at the present time. This conclusion is, however, limited to the
adoption of this interim regulation. It is possible that all or part of this informa-
tion should be required to be filed in supplemental records under the "further
information" clause of section 11l(d)(1). It is equally possible that all or part of
such information should not be required until the filing of accountings under
section 11 l(d)(2). These are serious issues to be explored in the further rulemak-
ing proceedings referred to earlier and no inferences or grounds of argument
should be drawn from our present action.
6. Regular carriage. Several copyright owners and broadcast organizations
objected to the statement in the preamble to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
that "identification of primary transmitters whose signals are carried on a
sporadic basis, such as under the program substitution rules of the Federal
Communications Commission, is not required." They asserted that cable sys-
tems might well engage in the consistent or "regular carriage" of particular
primary transmitters on a substitute basis. Some argued that identification of
even "sporadically" carried signals was required. Cable systems, however, took
the position that substituted programming can never be considered "regularly
carried."
The controversy appears to revolve around the issue of whether the word
"regular" has a categorical meaning (e.g., as opposed to "substituted" carriage),
or relates simply to the frequency or consistency of a carriage of any signal. The
Office is not in a position to determine this issue in the instant proceeding.
(Similarly, the Office cannot, under the statutory language and present record,
adopt the suggestion of one comment that it draw a definition of "regular
carriage" for radio signals.) The interim regulation adopts, without interpreta-
tion, the language of the statute.
